Abstract Electronic commerce needs the aid of sojhvare tools to check the validity of business processes in order to fully automate the exchange of information through the network.
Introduction
Electronic commerce is the ability to perform business transactions involving the exchange of goods and services between two or more parties using electronic tools and techniques.
In electronic commerce information is conveyed through electronic networks and computer systems and much of the transaction is automated. The kernel of electronic business is the business transaction and issues such as security and trust are the most important challenges in conducting an automated transaction. Electronic commerce applications do not yet provide robust transactions, messaging and data access services typical of contemporary clienthervice applications (Manchala In this paper we propose to conduct a complete search for process faults in the field of business transactions using formal methods for verifying safety and liveness properties of secure transactions, in order to improve process integrity. The approach we propose is based on model checking, a powefil formal verification method that determines whether a system model satisfies certain specifications under all circumstances (Emerson 86) . Model checking can locate subtle but critical flows that conventional assurance methods such as testing and simulation often miss. Model checkers, on the other hand, are fully automated tools to verify that a system model satisfy certain properties. Automation makes this formal method particularly attractive to business process.
We used a verification tool -Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV)-to formally verify safety properties of business transactions. To accomplish this, we used a model checking method: we created finitestate models of the system of interest and also identified and expressed relevant properties to verify in a properly defined logical language, CTL (Pnueli 77). We discuss the modeling of systems for internet-based business and transaction processes. We also show the formulation of specifications and discuss fundamental issues concerning the atomic transactions. With respect to other modeling techniques, such as UML (Conallen 99) or models based on object oriented approach (Manchala OO), the approach based on model checking guarantees the automation of the verification procedure. Our results from the verification are included to show the current capabilities of the modeling techniques and the model checker.
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Symbolic Model Checking
The power of the method is that it is automatic and fast. Automatic model checkers have been implemented using algorithms for checking the truth of temporal logic specifications on finite-state models (Katoen 99) . The model checker helps in finding errors in the design of system by producing a counter example that can be used to correct the model. The first model checkers represented models as graphs, where nodes in the graph represented states of the system and edges denoted possible transitions between states. Models are assumed to be Kripke structures, e.g. triples of the form M=(S,R,L) where S is a set of states, R E SxS is a relation which defines legal state transitions (i.e. the transition relation), and L is a function that labels each state with the atomic propositions that hold true on that state (Clarke 86). It is possible to algorithmically check such a model for satisfaction of temporal logic properties. It is also possible to algorithmically generate counterexamples when a model does not satis@ a temporal logic property. Therefore model checking procedures can be automated given a model M and temporal logic properties expressed in an appropriate language.
The model checking procedure carried out on graphs was efficient, but since the number of states in a finite-state model grows exponentially with the number of state variables, only small systems (103-106 states) could be checked (Clarke 99) . In fact, the main challenge in model checking is the state explosion problem. That problem occurs because of the many components that interact in a system or because of the concurrency properties among them. The state explosion problem was addressed by McMillan (1992) , who introduced symbolic model checking.
Symbolic model checking is a variation of model checking where sets of states and the transition relation are represented implicitly using Boolean formulas rather than an explicit graph structure (Bryant 86 
Computation Tree Logic (CTL)
Properties to be verified are expressed in a propositional, branching, temporal logic named Computation Tree Logic (CTL). We do not define here CTL; for an introduction, see (Clarke 99) . Any propositional logic formula is a CTL formula. CTL formulas may also contain path quantifier followed by temporal operators. The path quantifier E specifies some path from the current state while the path quantifier A specifies all paths from the current state. The temporal operators are X, the next-time operator, U, the until operator, and G, the always operator. X$ specifies the $ holds in the next state along the path. $Ucp specifies that $ holds on every state along the path until cp is true. G$ specifies that $ holds on every state along the path.
Given the above information, CTL can be defined by the following statements:
. -E-F EG (-I$): Some future state will be on a path in which 4 is never true.
* AG $: $ holds on every reachable state.
Symbolic Model Checbng Implementation
The CTL model checking method has been implemented in the package S M V (for symbolic model verifier) (McMillan). S M V has its own language for defining finite-state concurrent systems (i.e. the transition relation and the set of initial states). Once the transition relation is built, S M V executes the model checking procedures for the CTL properties. The S M V input language has provisions for representing systems which are hierarchical, modular and nondeterministic. SMV also provides counterexamples whenever necessary or possible.
S M V uses Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) for efficient representation and manipulation of Boolean formulas. OBDDs are directed, acyclic graphs, which are more compact than other currently used representations (Bryant 86). They are canonical w.r.t. a fixed variable ordering so identical fbnctions are isomorphic (usefbl for recognizing fixpoints). The number of nodes required to represent a hnction is sensitive to the variable ordering. Any Boolean operation can be applied to OBDDs, and functions may be substituted for variables, which permits the implementation of existential quantification routines (Bryant 92) .
S M V has been successfully used to verify electrical and computer hardware including synchronous protocols for distributed multiprocessors ( S M V ) .
The proposed model
We have developed the finite-state model of an atomic transaction and defined the set of specifications expressed in CTL to define the correct behavior of a system for business-to-consumer and business-to-business applications. The verification has been carried out using the SMV tool, to detect undesired events in the system behavior, otherwise hardly detectable, and to properly refine the model. Fig. 1 .a describes the flow of operation in a generic business-to-consumer transaction; fig. 1 .b describes interactions for a business-to-business.
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In this section we describe the variables, processes and operating procedures that we use to model a business process.
Mutual exclusion of concurrent processes
We model the system using three concurrent processes: Consumer, Producer and Server. The processes share two resources: Buffer and Database, using a well-known textbook exercise (Huth 99) .
Variables involved in the system model The system behavior is described through the set of variables in the following table: true if it is necessary adopt a security mechanism specify the authenticity of the signature true if it is necessary to check information referring to the validity of the signature specify whether the information may be critical the amount of bank credit available for the purchaser true if a request arrives to the system 
Atomic transactions
In fig.2 we show the transition diagram that describes how the system moves through its execution states. The first transition occurs as soon as a request arrives to the system. The Producer enters its critical region and the request is queued to the Buffer. In the next transition the Consumer enters the critical region to store the request in the Database and the Server schedules the request.
The Transaction procedure performs two different market operations -Purchase and Sell. The system can be in two different states depending on the operation. In case of Purchase a Start Setup Request procedure provides proper information to the supplier according to the request. For a Sell operation the diagram describes the execution states of an atomic transaction. The transaction goes in a run state after it starts execution. Process Start Check Sign checks the digital signature. Once the authentication is obtained, Start Bank Transfer can be executed. If the transaction ends successfully it goes in the commit state and then in the update state so that all the changes executed by the transaction will not be undone.
The Transaction enters the roll-back state after the error one if an error occurred during the processes execution. Two recovery states are available when the transaction is unsuccessfbl: undo to undo the effects of a transaction and redo to specify that some operations must be redone to ensure that all the operations of a committed transaction have been applied successfully.
Tested specifications
In the following we exemplify how the properties to verify have been expressed in CTL.
Mutual exclusion A first set of properties to be verified regards mutual exclusion of concurrent processes, as described in (Huth 99) .
Access to resources
The following set of properties ensures that each process tries to access to the shared resource z f f resources are available: i.e. the Producer cannot access to the Buffer if it is full or the Server cannot access to the Database if it is empty.
For any state ifprocess tries to access a resource then it will eventually be available
Correctness 
Error management
The following formulas are necessary to prevent errors in the system behavior. The properties require that the specified situations should not occur, in fact they are formulated as the negation of the undesirable event. 6. Refinement and evaluation of the model SMV was used to test the above specifications with respect to the system model that was synthesized, which is shown in fig.2 as a graph model. This section discusses the size and variation in the model, the computational resources required to check those variations, and the counterexamples that were found during the verification process.
In the first-stage test, we modeled the transaction process as well behaved. As we might expect, we found no counterexamples in this predictable situation. A base-ease model was established and then models containing more details were tested. The level of detail was increased incrementallv to search for faults that simpler models might not reveal and to observe the effects of model complexity on computational resources. Model complexity was increased by either adding more processes to the model or by modeling additional behaviors.
The aim was to verify that the system performs the transaction correctly or that the previous state is recovered when the transaction is unsuccessful.
To test the model validity we simulated some abnormal behavior during a transaction. In a business transaction, a critical issue is the signature authentication. We found counterexamples when we introduced somewhat abnormal behavior in this phase not unusual for b-2-b transactions. We modeled a process Checksign for the signature authentication to perform the following steps:
. send a request to the certification authority and wait for an acknowledge message decrypt the document using the same algorithm of the sender. The following are CTL formulas describing the undesired events that could happen if an error occurs during the two phases: Formula 1 and 2 specify that the following condition are never true simultaneously: 1) the signature is not valid and the Transaction reaches the commit state; 2) Checksign process is in error and the Transaction reaches the commit state.
The model checker returned the three counter examples. This was due to the logical model of the transaction process. In the adopted model the composition of processes is interleaved: a step represents a step by exactly one component. For this reason when S M V runs processes it does not consider their concurrent execution and this might determine some errors. To avoid the previously described undesired events it was necessary to introduce a hrther test on the state of each process. Once accomplished that all the conditions are verified, the process will start. This refinement of the model did not reveal incorrect behavior. We simulated another error condition in the process that performs the bank transfer. The following property verifies that the bank transfer will not be executed if the signature is false:
Once more we use the negation of the error condition to ensure that the undesired event will not ensue.
The following 2 specifications state that if the desirable properties of a transaction are not satisfied, the transaction cannot end with a commit state. ACID properties of a transaction state that resources should be in a consistent and durable state after the execution of the transaction. This means that the transaction cannot be in the commit state if the transfer was not successful. The last specification ensures that the transaction will never be in the commit state if an error occurs.
Conclusions
We used model checking for modeling the behavior of applications for business transactions. The model created was checked against temporal logic specifications, which identify desired system behavior. Through symbolic model checking, counterexamples for some of these specifications were found. Many of these counterexamples would have been diflicult to identify through conventional fault identification methods, because they were a result of multiple events occurring concurrently or sequentially. In many cases, a counterexample may point out a flaw in the model, which must be corrected. For this reason, the counterexamples helped in refining the model by adding firther details; the final model ensures a reliable level of trust, since model checker tests all pattern which are implicitly defined in the model.
